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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARY ELIZABETH COLBURN,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

]
i Docket No. 950225 CA
]
Priority No. 15

JAMES ROBERT COLBURN,
Defendant/Appellant.

;

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Section
78-2a-3(2)(i) of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court properly find that Defendant was

voluntarily underemployed, and did the court properly impute income
of $40,000.00 per year to Defendant, for purposes of awarding
alimony, where Defendant chose to start his own business as a
certified financial planner, even though he knew that it would take
him a minimum of five years to establish a profitable practice,
rather than utilize his readily transferrable and marketable skills
to

seek

full

$100,000.00

time

employment, which

per year?

Reviewed

could

earn

him

under the clearly

up

to

erroneous

standard to determine if the court improperly found that Defendant
1

was voluntarily underemployed-

Hill v. Hill. 869 P.2d 1209 (Utah

App. 1993).
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding

alimony of $1,000.00 per month for five (5) years and $500.00 per
month thereafter, where the parties enjoyed a very high standard of
living during their marriage, and where Mrs. Colburn demonstrated
both that she lacks sufficient funds to meet her ordinary monthly
expenses and that Defendant had the capacity to pay his expenses
and to provide spousal support for Mrs. Colburn?
abuse of discretion.

Reviewed for

Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, (Utah App.

1991) cert, denied, 817 P.2d 325 (Utah 1991), Crockett v. Crockett.
836 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1991).
3.

Did the trial court properly divide Defendant's naval

pension when it utilized the formula set forth in Woodward v.
Woodward, 656 P.2d 432, (Utah 1982), rather than the point system
allegedly used by the United States Armed Services, where there was
no testimony regarding the mechanics of the point system? Reviewed
under the correction of error standard to determine if the court
committed clear error in dividing the pension. Bingham v. Binghamr
872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A^.

NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. AND
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT:
This is an appeal from a Judgment awarding Mrs, Colburn

alimony and a portion of Defendant's Navy pension.
2

The judgment

was entered on September 12, 1994, by the Honorable Glenn Iwasaki,
Third District Court Judge, in connection with an action for decree
of divorce filed on May 12, 1994.
On September 14, 1994, Judge Iwasaki awarded Mrs. Colburn
permanent alimony in the amount of $1,000.00 per month for five (5)
years, and in the amount of $500.00 per month thereafter. (Tr. 10
[Bench Ruling - Appellant's Addendum 1]). The court also awarded
Mrs.

Colburn

retirement

thirty-four

plan

percent

(34%)

of

Defendant's

in accordance with the formula

set

naval

forth in

Woodward v. Woodward, supra.
Various post-trial motions concerning the language of the
findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by both parties,
and were resolved at a hearing held on March 3, 1995; the findings,
conclusions and decree were entered on that date.

Defendant also

filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment in re: alimony, which
motion was denied, without hearing, on December 29, 1994.
JL.

STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE;
1.

Mrs. Colburn and Defendant were married on September l,

1973, in San Francisco, California.
2.

(R. 212, Para. 2 FOF).

The parties have two children born as issue of this

marriage: Michelle Rene Colburn, born March 19, 1977, and James
Andrew Colburn, born April 12, 1983.
3.

(R. 212, Para. 4 FOF).

During the course of the parties1 marriage Mrs. Colburn

did not work for extended periods of time.

3

(Tr. 36).

4.
worked

During the course of the parties1 marriage, Defendant
for National

Aviation

Underwriters

from

1971 through

February, 1988 and Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters from
May, 1988 until July 1, 1992.

(Tr. 77, 83, 85, 90).

5. While working for National Aviation Underwriters Defendant
advanced through the ranks to became Regional Vice-President and
eventually President and Chief Operating Officer for the company.
(Tr. 36, 37, 76, 77, 78).
6. After leaving National Aviation Underwriters Defendant was
hired by Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters as one of its
Vice-Presidents.
7.

(Tr. 85).

During his time with National Aviation Underwriters

Defendant oversaw a variety of insurance related projects and also
acted in a managerial capacity over other employees.

(Tr. 36, 77,

78) .
8. The parties enjoyed a high standard of living during their
marriage, which included twice yearly vacations, and a financial
situation which permitted them to make regular contributions to
their savings and stock plans, beginning in 1982.
9.

During

accumulated

the

course

approximately

of

their

$450,000.00

marriage

in non-IRA

(Tr. 41, 42).
the

parties

assets, and

$608,000.00 in IRA accounts, which were divided equally between the
parties.
10.

(R. 214, 219; Para. 15, 35 FOF).
On July 1, 1992, the day he was ordered to pay $5,000.00

in family support by a Louisiana Court, Defendant submitted his
4

resignation from Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters, at the
request of the company.
11.
1990

(Tr. 32, 33, 34).

In 1989 Defendant earned $117,980 from employment; in

Defendant

$140,585.00;

earned

and,

in

$129,802.00;
1992

in

1991

Defendant

Defendant

earned

earned

$126,286.00.

(Defendant's Exhibit 27; R. 212, Para. 7 FOF).
12.

After

Underwriters,

resigning

Defendant

from

Southern Marine

contacted

three

(3)

and
or

Aviation
four

(4)

individuals, and attended one (1) interviews seeking employment.
(Tr. 39, 94).
13.

Defendant declined to seek employment in other areas of

the insurance business, and turned down two (2) job offers.

(Tr.

98) .
14.

Defendant declined to seek employment outside of his

specific areas of expertise in the aviation insurance industry,
desiring instead to start his own business as a financial planner
in Park City.
15.

(Tr. 98, 99, 100, 101).

In June of 1993, the parties relocated to Park City,

Utah, and Defendant started Summit Financial Advisors Group, Inc.,
in August of 1993.
16.

(Tr. 101, 102).

At the time Defendant chose to become a certified

financial planner he realized that it would take four to five years
to establish a profitable business.
FOF) .

5

(Tr. 105; R. 213; Para. 11

17.

Defendant

refused

to

seek

additional

or

outside

employment to support his family, in spite of repeated requests
from Mrs, Colburn to do so.

(Tr. 34).

18. Defendant was requested by the President of VEMCO to head
up its commercial department.
19.

(Tr. 180).

Defendant testified that he did not look for employment

in other areas of the insurance industry because he was tired of
getting bumped out of the corporate jobs.
20.

Defendant's

refusal

to

(Tr. 180).

seek

employment

was

a

precipitating factor in inducing the divorce, and caused Mrs.
Colburn to seek employment outside the home for the first time in
seven (7) years.

(Tr. 34, 36).

21. At the time of trial, Defendant was fifty-one (51) years
of age.

He is in good health, has a college education, and a

certificate as a Certified Financial Planner, and has job skills
acquired during his employment as an officer in the Naval Armed
Services and as a high level executive with National Aviation
Underwriters and Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters that can
be

transferred

to different

or

other

fields

of

employment,

including marketing and public relations manager and management
consultant.
22.

(Tr. 75, 142; R. 213, Para. 10 FOF).

In the Salt Lake labor market there are close to 100

firms that are engaged in financial planning services.

6

(Tr. 128).

23.

The salary for those employed in the area of financial

planning services ranges from $28,000.00 to $71,000.00 annually.
(Tr. 128).
24.

Normally, Utah salaries are ninety-five percent (95%) of

the national average.
25.

(Tr. 128).

Defendant could expand his practice by expanding his

business into commission sales planning.
26.

(Tr. 150).

Employees hired by financial planning services are also

given the opportunity to earn their security licenses while they
work for those firms.
27.

(Tr. 128, 129).

Defendant did not desire employment with an established

financial planning firm because he believed that he can make more
money as an independent Certified Financial Planner.
28.

Management

consultants

can

commonly

(Tr. 186).

earn

between

$75,000.00 and $100,000.00 per annum. The middle range of salaries
for those in this position is between $24,900.00 and $51,000.00 per
annum. Salaries in Utah would be approximately ninety-five percent
(95%) of this range.
29.

(Tr. 143).

Salaries for public relations managers range between

$36,000.00 to $52,000.00 per annum.
30.

a

commercial

classification, trained by the United States military.

(Tr. 162).

31.

Defendant

Co-pilots

is a

(Tr. 142).

earn

$28,000.00 to $36,000.00.

licensed

an annual
(Tr. 129).

7

pilot,

salary

with

in the

range of

32.

Defendant estimates that he can eventually earn between

$30,000.00 and $40,00.00 per year as a certified financial planner.
(Tr. 189).
33.

In addition to the non-IRA and IRA funds divided equally

by the parties, Defendant is the owner of an ULTRA investment
account, which was valued, at the time of trial, at $61,220.67. The
court imputed income to Defendant at a rate of six percent (6%) per
annum on that account, for a monthly total of $306.10.

(R. 214,

Para. 17 FOF) .
34.

The court also imputed income to both parties in the

amount of $1,125.00 per month, as interest, on their non-IRA funds.
(R. 214, Para. 16 FOF).
35.

The trial court found that Defendant was voluntarily

underemployed, and determined that he could earn an annual salary
of $40,000.00, or $3,333.33 per month, should he choose to remedy
his voluntary underemployment.

This figure was based on his work

history, his occupational qualifications, the transferability of
his

skills,

the

prevailing

earnings

of

people

with

similar

backgrounds in the community and the testimony of experts. (R. 213,
Para. 12 FOF).
36.

I

Defendant's gross monthly

income from all sources,

including income imputed due to his voluntary underemployment, is
$5,028.43.
37.

(R. 213, 214; Para. 12, 16, 17 FOF).
Defendant's monthly expenses at the time of trial,

including child support, were $2,179.00. Defendant's child support
8

obligation was reduced by $260.00 in June of 1995, when his oldest
child reached 18 years of age.

(Defendant's Exhibit 28, as

corrected in Appellant's Brief, Point II).
38.

Defendant has a positive cash flow of $2,849.43 per

month. ($5,028.43 [income] - $2,179.00 [expenses] = $2,849.43).
(R. 213, 214; Para. 12, 16, 17 FOF; Defendant's Exhibit 28, as
corrected in Appellant's Brief, Point II).
39.

Mrs. Colburn is a registered nurse, earning a gross

monthly salary of $2,900.00 per month.
40.

(Tr. 35; Para. 13 FOF).

At the time of divorce, Mrs. Colburn's total gross

monthly income, including interest imputed on the non-IRA funds and
child support, was $4,729.00 ($2,900.00 employment, $1,125.00 nonIRA earnings, $704.00 child support).

(R. 213, 214, 215; Para. 18

FOF) .
41.

Mrs. Colburn's monthly expenses at the time of divorce

totaled $3,906.30, which did not include allowances for regular
vacations generally taken by the family or contributions to her
savings plan.
42.

(Tr. 42, Plaintiff's Exhibit 7).

Based on gross wages, not taking

into account tax

considerations, Mrs. Colburn has a monthly positive cash flow of
$822.70.

(R. 213, 214, 215; Para. 18 FOF; Plaintiff's Exhibit 7).

43. During the year prior to the parties' divorce the marital
residence was sold.
44.

(Tr. 168).

The court found that Mrs. Colburn would need to purchase

a new home.

(Tr. 9 [Bench Ruling - Appellant's Addendum 1]).
9
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insurance
SKUIS.

to $100,000.00 a year, if he chose to seek employment rather than
start his own financial planning business.
III.

The trial court was well within its discretion when it

awarded Mrs. Colburn $1,000.00 per month in alimony for the first
five (5) years after the divorce, and $500.00 per month thereafter.
The court provided the necessary analysis for each of the factors
required to award alimony, and also considered that Mrs. Colburn
had been accustomed to a relatively high standard of living during
the course of the parties' marriage.

Mrs. Colburn demonstrated a

need for alimony, and Mr. Colburn has both the earning capacity and
the accumulated capital necessary to provide such support*
IV, The trial court properly awarded Mrs. Colburn thirty-four
percent

(34%) of Defendant's military pension, based upon the

formula set forth in Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P. 2d 431 (Utah
1982).

Woodward is the leading case regarding the distribution of

retirement benefits, and there was no testimony introduced at trial
as to how the navy "point system" worked.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SATISFACTORILY MARSHALL
THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE COURT COMMITTED
CLEAR ERROR WHEN IT FOUND THAT DEFENDANT WAS
VOLUNTARILY UNDEREMPLOYED. THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING SHOULD BE LEFT UNDISTURBED.
In

contesting

the

conclusion

that

he

is

voluntarily

underemployed, Defendant has posed a challenge to a finding of fact
made by the trial court after hearing, considering and weighing the
11
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VJI

Wi*

w l t u ^ i .
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A

^ C i

1986 to 1988 and vice president of Southern Marine and Aviation
Underwriters from 1988 until 1992.
failed

to

note

that

Connie

(Tr. 78, 126). Defendant also

Romboy,

rehabilitation\employment

specialist at the Career Guidance Center, testified that it is
essential to look at the transferability and marketability of the
skills obtained as a result of Defendant's employment as a highlevel executive to accurately determine what he might make in the
current labor market.
testimony,

Ms. Romboy1s

(Tr. 137).
conclusion

Without reference to that
that

Defendant

might make

between $36,000.00 and $52,000.00 per year as a public relations
manager and up to $100,00.00 per year as a management consultant is
taken

out

meaningful.

of

its

proper

context

and

thereby

rendered

less

(Tr. 142, 143). Defendant also declined to note that

he sent no resumes or applications for employment to companies
operating outside of a contracting aviation insurance industry;
that after losing his job with Southern Marine and Aviation, the
president of VEMCO asked him to head up its commercial department;
and, that he declined to seek employment

outside of aviation

insurance because he was "tired of getting bumped out of corporate
jobs".

(Tr. 180).

Defendant's failure to adequately marshall the evidence is
also apparent when the court considers that paucity of references
to the evidence of career possibilities that exist for him outside
of operating his own business.

For example, Defendant makes no

mention of the fact that he was trained as a pilot by the United
13
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL DEMONSTRATED
THAT DEFENDANT IS A HIGHLY TRAINED CORPORATE EXECUTIVE
WITH JOB SKILLS THAT COULD BE READILY TRANSFERRED TO
OTHER SECTORS OF PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT. IN IMPUTING
INCOME OF $40,000.00 PER ANNUM TO DEFENDANT THE
COURT ACTED CONSERVATIVELY BY CHOOSING A FIGURE
AT THE LOW END OF SPECTRUM OF THE SALARIES PAID FOR
THE TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT AVAILABLE FOR SOMEONE WITH
DEFENDANT'S SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE.
Utah law requires that prior to imputing income to a party in
a divorce action the court must first find that the party is
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.

Utah Code Ann., Section

78-45-7.5(7)(a), which has been applied in both child support and
alimony cases, codifies this requirement and provides:
Income may not be imputed to a parent unless
the parent stipulates to the amount imputed or
a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
The question of what constitutes voluntary underemployment has
been the subject of considerable activity in the appellate courts
in recent years.

In Hall v. Hall, supra, at 1026, the Utah Court

of Appeals explained that a finding of voluntarily underemployment
must be based on a thorough appraisal of a variety of factors,
including the party's abilities, his employment

capacity, his

earnings potential, and the possible job openings available to the
party.

In this case, the trial court considered and weighed each

of these factors, and concluded that Defendant had significant
marketable skills, acquired over a lifetime of employment as a high
level

executive, which would

allow
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opportunities available in that arena, such a narrow focus could
mislead the Court into thinking that he has no opportunities for
meaningful employment outside of the general aviation industry.
Upon direct examination, Ms. Connie Roraboy, a vocational expert,
who specializes in displaced workers testified as follows:
Either of these positions [vice-president and
president] would plan and develop policies and
objectives, coordinate functions of operations
between divisions and departments to establish
responsibilities and procedures. They would
set financial goals. They would plan with the
current conditions of the labor market, and
they would direct coordinate the formulation
of financial programs to maximize profits and
increase productivity ... and then based on
the specific industry or product, then they
would be — then that would be specific to
their particular duties.
But the things that I have read off in terms
of this definition is really the definition of
transferability of skills.
There's the
assumption that if one can plan and develop
policies to operate, for instance, a career
guidance center, that same individual could go
to the University of Utah and plan and develop
policies for perhaps the Department of Social
Work, or perhaps transfer into a hospital
setting where still — so the whole basis is
that the functional things are much more
important than the specific work content
skills which are often the things that are the
easiest. In other words, its easier to learn
about a product than it is ... how to direct
and plan and manage people. That is the
foundation that most vocational evaluators
will go in terms of doing a workup on
potential
employment.
(Tr. 140, 141)
(emphasis added).
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was "tired of getting bumped out of corporate jobs".1

(Tr. 180).

He also testified that he had limited himself to fee-only financial
planning, rather than the broader and more profitable field of
commission sales planning.

(Tr. 150, 180).

This self-imposed

limitation means that he did not seek employment from any of the
more than one hundred (100) companies selling financial planning
services that are located on the Wasatch front.

(Tr. 128). Ms.

Romboy testified that nationally such financial consultants can
expect to earn between $28,000.00 and $71,000.00 per year, with
Utah wages being ninety-five percent (95%) of the national average.
(Tr. 128).
Defendant's

testimony,

in conjunction

with

Ms.

Romboyfs

testimony about transferable skills, was the foundation upon which
the court determined that Defendant was voluntarily underemployed.
In his bench ruling Judge Iwasaki stated:
There were many times in his testimony when
asked, upon cross examination or even direct
examination, if he would choose to go into one
area or another. There were answers to the
effect that: I choose to be a certified
financial planner. [•••]
This is what I want
to develop.
He did that knowing that the start up time at
a minimum of four to five years will have to
occur before anything of fruition will come of
his efforts ...
1

This testimony was elicited in connection with an inquiry
about possible employment outside of the general aviation
underwriting business, and testimony that after resigning from
Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriting he was asked by the
Chairman of VEMCO to head up its commercial department.(Tr. 180).
19

Even being^conservative in looking at Ms.
Romboy's testimony, it appears to the court
that if Mr. Colburn, with his vast experience,
his education and his practical aspects that I
find of him to be attractive in that nature,
if he were just to apply himself in any other
area instead of persisting in the certified
financial planning area
he could be
selling insurance ... he could be working with
IDS, which was a product sales as well as
service; he could be doing sto;k brokerage, if
he completes his licensing, i^.r.
> to eight
months he indicated that would
;Ke: there
would be no doubt in the court's
i that he
would be successful ,, . ii_.
[Bench
Ruling - Appellant's Addendum
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three recent cases: Hall v. Hall. 858 P. 2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993);
Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991); and Willev v. Willev.
866 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1993).
In Hall v. Hall, supra, the husband had been employed as a
computer consultant and software developer and had earnings in
excess of $100,000.00 per year in the three (3) years immediately
preceding trial.
husband

lost

Approximately ten (10) days before trial the

his job

$40,000.00 per year.
prior

earnings

and

obtained

another,

which

paid

only

The trial court found, on the basis of his

history,

that

the

husband

was

voluntarily

underemployed and that income should be imputed at a level equal to
his prior wages.

The court of appeals overturned that decision,

and remanded the case for more detailed finding, stating that past
salary was only one factor that must be considered in making a
determination of underemployment.
In Bell v. Bell, supra, the trial court ignored undisputed
testimony that Mrs. Bell actually earned $863.00 per month as a
part time teaching assistant at Utah State University, and imputed
income to her at a level equal to that which she had previously
enjoyed as a full-time school teacher in another state. Similarly,
in Willey v. Willev. supra, the trial court first imputed income to
the wife based upon full-time employment at her current wage, and
then raised that figure by speculating, without foundation, that
Mrs. Willey would be able to raise her income to $1,500.00 to
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financial planner earning $260.00 per month, Defendant continually
asserted he chose to do so because that is where his education and
interests lie.

(Tr. 180) . This choice was made at the expense of

the opportunity to make a higher salary in a job less related to
his expressed desire to become a fee-only

financial planner.

While, Mr. Colburn is free to make such a personal decision, in
light of the ruling in Hill, his personal preferences should not
undermine his obligations to support Mrs. Colburn.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN AWARDING $1,000.00 PER MONTH IN ALIMONY
TO MRS. COLBURN. MRS. COLBURN DEMONSTRATED BOTH
THAT SHE NEEDED THE SUPPORT AND THAT DEFENDANT
HAD THE CAPACITY TO PAY.
It is a well established principle of Utah law that a trial
court

is granted broad discretion

in fashioning

an award of

alimony. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 819 (Utah App. 1992).
It is equally clear that the appellate courts must presume that the
trial court has made the proper decision in this area, and uphold
its ruling, unless the record indicates that there has been a clear
and prejudicial abuse of discretion.

Id. . at 819-820 (quoting

Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982)).

See also Bingham v.

Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Howell v.
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211, cert, denied, 817 P.2d 325 (Utah
1991)).

An abuse of discretion is committed when a trial court

has made its decision without reference to established standards.
Willev, supra at 550.
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In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court set forth the standard test for awarding alimony in
Utah, The court stated:
Three factors ... must be considered in fixing a
reasonable alimony award:
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the
[spouse seeking support]
[2] the ability of the [spouse seeking support]
to produce a sufficient income for herself; and
[3] the ability of the [payor spouse] to provide
support.
This standard has appeared repeatedly in cases addressing the
issue of the propriety of awarding alimony. Thronson v. Thronson,
810 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah App. 1991), Hill v. Hill, supra, and
Schaumbera v. Schaumbera. supra•
In the case at bar, there can be no doubt that the trial court
utilized these criteria in determining that Defendant should pay
Mrs. Colburn alimony. It is equally clear that, under the facts of
this case, the trial court acted well within its discretion in
fixing the award at $1,000.00 per month for the first five (5)
years, and $500.00 per month thereafter.
In considering the needs of Mrs. Colburn the court first
looked to her fixed monthly expenses and determined that the total
of $3,906.30 was a reasonable amount for a person of her station in
life.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 7). This sum did not include amounts

normally used for regular savings and family vacations, which had
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been substantial in the past.3

In addition, the court noted that

the parties had previously sold their marital residence, and that
Mrs. Colburn would have a specific need for a new home.

(Tr. 9

[Bench Ruling - Appellant's Addendum 1]).
The court then looked to Mrs. Colburn's ability to pay those
expenses. It was uncontroverted that Mrs. Colburn, who returned to
the work force as a registered nurse after many years of not
working, earns $2,900.00 a month.
FOF) .

(Tr. 35, 36; R. 213; Para. 13

The court also imputed income of $1,125.00 per month as a

reasonable rate of return on her non-IRA investments. (R. 214;
Para. 16 FOF).

Together with child support in the amount of

$704.00 awarded at trial4, Mrs. Colburn has gross monthly resources
of $4,729.00 to meet her expenses. Defendant has claimed that this
leaves Mrs. Colburn with a positive cash flow of $823.00 per month,
exclusive of alimony.
all tax consequences.

Of course this statement completely ignores
In fact, Mrs. Colburn pays $800.00 in

regular taxes and deductions from her paycheck; these taxes, in
themselves, completely consume the alleged positive cash flow.
In contrast Defendant has the ability to generate $5,028.4 3 in
gross monthly income, including income imputed to him by the trial
3

It is entirely proper that the court consider these
additional expenditures. In Schaumberg, supra, at 602, the Court
of Appeals stated that when the payor spouse's resources are
adequate, an alimony award should also consider the recipient's
station in life.
4

This sum has subsequently been reduced when the parties'
oldest child reached 18 years of age in June of 1995.
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court.

(R. 213, 214; Para. 12, 16, 17 FOF). His fixed monthly

expenses total $2,179.00, including child support, leaving him with
a positive cash flow of $2,849.43 per month.

(Defendant's Exhibit

28, as corrected in Appellant's Brief, Point II).

Thus, Defendant

is able to pay his monthly expenses, provide Mrs. Colburn the
support ordered by the court, and still have a positive cash flow
of $1,849.43. This, in fact, is slightly greater than the positive
cash flow that is enjoyed by Mrs. Colburn when alimony is added to
her gross monthly income ($823.00 + $1,000.00 = $1,823.00).
Since all three elements set forth in Jones, supra, were
weighed by the court and adequate findings were entered, it is
difficult to imagine that the court has abused its discretion in
making such an award.
Defendant's sole argument for abuse of discretion lies in his
convoluted reasoning that the court should have considered only his
actual income in fashioning his alimony obligation. Thus he claims
that the payment of alimony lowers his standard of living below
that enjoyed by Mrs. Colburn, which would be impermissible under
the holding in Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App.
1988).

Defendant's argument ignores the obvious point; it is not

the payment of alimony that is creating his alleged financial
distress, it is his voluntary choice not to seek the salaried
employment for which he is eminently qualified.
Defendant also briefly argues that the alimony award was, in
part, based on the trial court's recognition that Mrs. Colburn is
26

currently pursuing a graduate degree in nursing so as to obtain a
better paying position in the future.
not the case.

(Tr. 42) .

This is simply

In fact, the court determined that after Mrs.

Colburn obtained her degree she would be capable of a greater level
of self support.

This in turn was used to justify a decrease in

the award to $500.00 per month after the five

(5) years she

estimated it would take to finish her education. Under the second
prong of the Jones test, such reasoning is both appropriate and
necessary in fixing an alimony obligation.
Simply stated the court committed no abuse of discretion in
awarding Mrs. Colburn alimony in the amount of $1,000.00 per month.
POINT IV
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN APPLYING THE WOODWARD
FORMULA IN DIVIDING DEFENDANT'S NAVAL RETIREMENT.
NO TESTIMONY WAS INTRODUCED TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S
CONTENTION THAT THE VALUE OF HIS PENSION IS
DETERMINED BY A POINT SYSTEM.
Under well established Utah law, pension rights are subject to
equitable division by the court under the formula set forth in
Woodward v. Woodwardr 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).

In that case, the

court stated that the proper method of distribution is to divide
the number of years the parties1 have been married by the number of
years the spouse has worked at the relevant place of employment;
with the non-pensioned spouse entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of
that amount.

This is precisely what the court did in this case.

Defendant has sought to have this decision overturned, by
claiming that the true value of his pension is measured by a point
27

system rather than by the total number of years he served in the
service. Unfortunately, there was no testimony introduced at trial
to substantiate that claim.

Defendant, himself, attempted to

explain the system to the court, however, his testimony was
excluded, upon objection of Plaintifffs counsel, as lacking proper
foundation to testify in that regard.

(Tr. 114).

Without competent testimony, the court was without a reliable
means of determining how to translate the accrued points into a set
monetary value. Accordingly, it relied upon the formula set forth
in Woodward, supra, to determine the proper equitable division of
the asset.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's challenge to the court's imputation of income
fails on two points. First, he has failed to marshall the evidence
in a manner sufficient for the Court of Appeals to determine that
the trial court committed clear error in finding that he was
voluntarily underemployed.
introduced

at

trial

Second, the evidence and testimony

clearly

supports

the

court's

finding.

Defendant is a highly trained executive, with skills that could be
easily transferred to other areas of employment, if he so desired.
Defendant's challenge to the amount of the alimony award must
also be denied.
well

established

suffered

The court fixed his obligation in accordance with
legal

by Defendant

standards, and any

financial

hardship

is the result of his refusal

to seek

employment, rather than as a result of the award itself.
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Finally, the court should decline to overrule the trial
court's distribution of Defendant's naval pension.

The .court

accomplished that division by clear reference to the appropriate
legal standards set forth in Woodward, supra, and Defendant failed
to introduce any testimony in support of his alternate "point
system" theory of distribution.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J£

day of November, 1995.
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